

activists are in line with those of the “senders” (of support, pressure, help, etc.). It should be noted, however, that these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. They can be employed at different points in the campaign or even simultaneously.

In both campaigns it is clear that the sending end actors framed the problem in ways that did not mesh well with those on the receiving end. The anti child labor frame employed in the Bangladesh campaign took a moral stance against child labor which many Bangladeshi activists agreed with, but it did not address the fact that simply removing children from the garment industry could result in more harm than good. The families of children forced out of the garment sector relied on their children’s income for basic survival, so when options became more limited these children often took employment in more hazardous sectors. While the impetus behind the campaign was noble, without a focus on changing the conditions that make child labor necessary, it was in fact detrimental and led to the overt blocking of the campaign by local activists. Although Mexican activists took issue with the limited scope of the Human Rights Watch campaign against pregnancy screening within sweatshops, various groups participated in the campaign and used the political space that it opened up in order to articulate their own message at the grassroots level. According to Hertel, a key factor in this case was the fact that the campaign against pregnancy screening did not include economic sanctions, as was the case in the campaign in Bangladesh.

Independently, both of the cases described by Hertel provide social movement scholars with important insights; taken together, the cases illuminate the many factors that shape transnational advocacy campaigns. Delivering a multifaceted explanation of the genesis and evolution of both campaigns, Hertel synthesizes rationalist, structural, and social movement analyses (although the synthesis is more thoroughly executed in the Mexican case). Drawing upon Jonathan Fox’s work, Hertel evaluates the effects of both campaigns with almost a decade’s distance. In the end, she draws the conclusion that blocking produces more significant changes than backdoor moves do. That said, in an ideal campaign, blocking would not have to occur. Those initiating transnational advocacy campaigns would be wise to take heed of a key point of this book: acknowledging and understanding differences in how rights are conceived, and the policy implications thereof, are “critical to developing shared strategies for effective, inclusive advocacy—and meaningful solutions to the

problems that provoked contentious politics in the first place” (p.110).

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L.M. Bogad. *Electoral Guerrilla Theatre: Radical Ridicule and Social Movements*. New York: Routledge, 2005. \$33.95 (paper).

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In 1992, an African-American, working-class drag queen named Joan JettBlakk ran for President of the United States under the slogan “Lick Bush in ‘92.” In 1970, a party of anarchist gnomes ran for city council in Amsterdam. In 1998, another drag queen named Pauline Pantsdown, who rose to fame with the disco hit “I’m a Backdoor Man,” ran for a seat on the Australian Senate. These outlandish political campaigns garner public attention, but what do they mean? Why do such unconventional and seemingly unelectable candidates run for office? These are the questions explored in L.M. Bogad’s delightfully written and wonderfully provocative book *Electoral Guerrilla Theatre: Radical Ridicule and Social Movements*. Bogad argues that these campaigns are examples of an innovative social movement tactic that combines electoral participation with grassroots, guerrilla-style street theater and thereby disrupts the dichotomy between working inside or outside of the system. This book documents three examples of electoral guerrilla campaigns and explains their intentions and their outcomes by synthesizing social movement literature with theories of theater and performance studies.

Bogad argues that electoral guerrilla theater appears in democracies where groups of people feel shut out of the system, despite claims of universal suffrage. In this context, guerrilla candidates step in to parody a particular candidate, but more generally to mock the exclusivity of the broader system. Often guerrilla candidates are connected to a specific marginalized group. Their performances make use of “insider” humor that energizes and solidifies the communities from which the candidates emerge. In addition, guerrilla candidates embody outlandish personae and articulate outrageous platforms in order to point out the ritualized and contrived aspects of the campaign process. Such exaggerated performativity has much in common with drag shows, and indeed two of the examples Bogad presents are drag queens. However, guerrilla candidates seek to attack not conventions of sex and gender, but rather the legitimacy of the electoral process.

In the case of the “Lick Bush in ‘92” campaign, Joan JettBlakk announced her candidacy for the U.S. Presidency with the support of the Chicago chapter of Queer Nation. The goal of the campaign was to use JettBlakk’s drag persona—complete with heavy makeup, loads of costume jewelry, and bright wigs—to increase the visibility of the queer community and to critique the assimilationist strategy utilized by some segments of the gay and lesbian movement. In addition, JettBlakk’s public statements often included serious critiques of the political system for excluding not only queer people, but also women, people of color, and the working class.

In Amsterdam, the goal of the Kabouters (Dutch for “gnomes”) was to build a movement toward direct participatory democracy and call attention to such issues as environmental preservation and the city’s housing shortage. Kabouters used playful performances and zap actions such as “Operation Wandering Branch,” in which participants planted trees in congested urban areas. When the police showed up and arrested the activists, the Kabouters succeeded in both calling attention to the shortage of green space in the city and making the authorities look foolish for arresting the nonviolent and seemingly harmless participants. When Kabouters began their campaign for city council, they claimed that they were running not to serve as political representatives, since many Kabouters were anarchists opposed to representative democracy, but rather to work as ambassadors from a utopian society they called the “Orange Free State.”

Pauline Pantsdown’s 1998 campaign for a seat in the Australian Senate was intended to parody the far right parliamentary member Pauline Hanson. Hanson was a Member of Parliament and founder of the “One Nation Party” who gained notoriety for her outspoken, anti immigration and anti Aboriginal views. Composer and sound editor Simon Hunt used the drag character Pauline Pantsdown to mock Hanson’s racist agenda; he even legally changed his name to appear on the ballot as “Pauline Pantsdown” in a race against David Oldfield, Hanson’s former advisor and the second most prominent member of the One Nation Party. Pantsdown imitated Hanson’s attire and hairstyle, combining them with exaggerated makeup. Using his musical and recording skills, Hunt created songs such as “I’m a Backdoor Man” and “I Don’t Like It” in which he digitally reorganized Hanson’s own words into ridiculous statements and added a disco beat. The popularity of the songs helped diminish Hanson’s credibility. They also drained energy and resources from the One Nation Party as Hanson sought a court injunction against one of the songs. The

legal challenge diminished Hanson’s stature even further; her Statement of Claim appeared trivial by asserting that the song “I’m a Backdoor Man” misrepresented her by describing her as, among other things, a homosexual and “a potato.”

In his description of these cases, Bogad discusses the cultural and political context in which the campaigns appear. For example, the JettBlakk presidential campaign emerged in Chicago, a city notorious for its history of election fraud. Although the U.S. two-party system prevented JettBlakk from getting on the ballot, the very difficulties she faced as a third-party candidate lent some legitimacy to her critiques of the system as exclusionary. The ability of the Kabouters to attract members was caused in part by the severe housing shortage in Amsterdam and by a history of social movement activism. Also, the Kabouters’ critique of representative democracy resonated at a time when the forty-five elected members of the city council served mostly as a rubber stamp for decisions made by the federally appointed mayor and the eight-member College of Lawholders (p.57). In Australia, mandatory voting, a proportional representational system with preferences, and the relative ease of getting on the ballot all helped Pauline Pantsdown gain visibility. By showing how the context shaped the decisions made in each of the electoral guerrilla campaigns, Bogad elucidates the interplay between culture and politics. He shows not only that cultural performances are a strategy to criticize the political system, but also that the political context shapes cultural performances.

Bogad further analyzes the strategic utility of electoral guerrilla theater as a social movement tactic. Campaigning is often a clever strategy by which activists can obtain visibility and protection: both the JettBlakk and Kabouter campaigns strategically sought media coverage to reduce police brutality against activists. The tactic worked because of the ritualistic nature of campaigns: electoral guerrilla actors can count on media coverage and make use of the predictable statements and sound bites of “real” candidates. (This strategy is most obvious in the Pauline Pantsdown campaign, which turned Pauline Hanson’s own words into a weapon against the One Nation Party.) However, Bogad also points out the limitations of electoral guerrilla campaigns as a social movement strategy. Guerrilla candidates cannot control their media coverage or how the audience will interpret their performance. This problem often leads to fragmentation of the movement. The JettBlakk campaign, for example, split from Queer Nation because the campaign started making decisions without input from rank and file Queer Nation members.

Among the Kabouters, fragmentation was precipitated by their unintended success—they actually won five seats on the city council. A problem emerged when some wanted to use their council position to act like “real” politicians and make change. Others wanted only publicity as they continued their outrageous zap actions and parodies within the city council by, for instance, smoking a hashish joint during meetings. Along with the conflict between Kabouters on the city council, many rank and file members felt distanced from the council Kabouters and thought that the election undermined the participatory ethic of the entire movement.

In some ways, the Pantsdown campaign seems to be the most successful example described by Bogad. Pantsdown’s specific goal to undermine Hanson and the One Nation Party seemed to work: Hanson lost her seat in parliament and Oldfield was defeated. However, Pantsdown was working only loosely in cooperation with leftist, gay, and multicultural movements in Australia. The campaign was run mostly as an individual action and not tied to a collective social movement. When Simon Hunt tried later to use the same theatrical strategy, employing a persona he called Little Johnny Coward to criticize Prime Minister John Howard’s antiaboriginal policies he failed to get much media coverage.

Despite the limitations of electoral guerrilla actors, Bogad points out their creativity, vitality, and important accomplishments. JettBlakk’s campaign entertained and energized the queer community. It also obtained the visibility it sought and posed some critiques of the U.S. political system. As JettBlakk herself remarked, “We took our message to people who never expected to see a drag queen at all much less one who was running for President” (p.161). Before the Kabouter movement broke apart, it mobilized enough voters to become the fourth largest party in Amsterdam. It also established organic food shops, provided services for the elderly, and called attention to the housing shortage and environmental pollution. Along with creating alternative institutions and cultural changes, Kabouters contributed to lasting changes in Amsterdam’s political process by helping to open the door for city council members to make proposals and motions rather than just follow the proposals of the College of Lawmakers. Moreover, in each of the cases studied here, guerrilla campaigns have become part of the history of protest around which marginalized groups can rally in the future.

Like the electoral guerrilla candidates he studies, Bogad tackles a serious topic without taking himself too seriously. His book contributes

to theories of social movements and theater without resorting to jargon. By drawing from three fascinating examples, Bogad convincingly makes the case for electoral guerrilla theater as a social movement tactic and analyzes its strengths, weaknesses, and outcomes. This book is valuable reading for any scholar of social movements. In addition, because Bogad’s writing is accessible and engaging, it would be an excellent text for classes on social movements, culture, or politics.

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James M. Jasper. *Getting Your Way: Strategic Dilemmas in the Real World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. \$28.00 (cloth).

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Those who know James Jasper’s many contributions to the sociology of social movements might be a bit surprised to see that he has written a book on strategy. Generally, Jasper is regarded as someone who has made major contributions to studying culture—the culture of social movements, the culture of protest, and general trends in American culture. He has written on collective identity and emotions, studied the “moral shocks” that can induce people to action, and coauthored a well known critique of political opportunity structure theories; his 1997 book was on the “art” of moral protest. By contrast, strategy would seem to be ultimate concept in the contentious politics, rational-structuralist approach to social movements. Motivations are reduced mostly to interests—and calculating cognitive, as opposed to moral or affective, processes seem to dominate action. Strategy has been the domain of game theorists and mathematical modeling.

While Jasper doesn’t put it in quite these terms, it seems to me that in *Getting Your Way* Jasper is trying to do for “strategy” as a concept what he did for “culture” in *The Art of Moral Protest*. He is laying out a set of definitions, concepts, and levels of analysis for its study; and he works at trying to find theoretical room for agency and individual level complexity (individual level for both persons and situations) without resort to rational choice theory. By emphasizing the “real world,” the contingency of empirical situations, and the processual nature and temporal order of social actions, Jasper considers how strategic action really is strategic interaction (p.6) and how humans negotiate that. He argues persuasively (I didn’t need much persuading personally, but I was glad to have the argument laid out clearly) that the mathematical